Abstract. Hybrid systems are integrations of discrete computation and continuous physical evolution. The physical components of such systems introduce safety requirements, the achievement of which asks for the correct monitoring and control from the discrete controllers. However, due to denial-of-service security attack, the expected information from the controllers is not received and as a consequence the physical systems may fail to behave as expected. This paper proposes a formal framework for expressing denial-of-service security attack in hybrid systems. As a virtue, a physical system is able to plan for reasonable behavior in case the ideal control fails due to unreliable communication, in such a way that the safety of the system upon denial-of-service is still guaranteed. In the context of the modeling language, we develop an inference system for verifying safety of hybrid systems, without putting any assumptions on how the environments behave. Based on the inference system, we implement an interactive theorem prover and have applied it to check an example taken from train control system.
A Motivating Example We illustrate our motivation by an example taken from train control system, that is depicted in Fig. 1 . It consists of three inter-communicating components: Train, Driver and on board vital computer (VC). We assume that the train owns arbitrarily long movement authority, within which the train is allowed to move only, and must conform to a safety requirement, i.e. the velocity must be non-negative and cannot exceed a maximum limit. The train acts as a continuous plant, and moves with a given acceleration; both the driver and the VC act as controllers, in such a way that, either of them observes the velocity of the train periodically, and then according to the safety requirement, computes the new acceleration for the train to follow in the next period. According to the specification of the system, the message from the VC always takes high priority over the one from the driver. However, the expected monitoring and control from VC or driver may fail due to denial-of-service security attack, e.g. if the driver falls asleep, or if the VC gets malfunction, and as a consequence, the train may get no response from any of them within a duration of time. The safety requirement of the train will then be violated very easily. This poses the problem of how to build a safe hybrid system in the presence of this sort of denial-of-service security attack from the environment.
The contribution of this paper includes the following aspects:
-a programming notation, for formally modeling hybrid systems and meanwhile being able to express denial-of-service due to unreliable communications, and an assertion language, for describing safety as annotations in such programs; -a deductive inference system, for reasoning about whether the program satisfies the annotated safety property, and a subsequent interactive theorem prover.
As a direct application, we are able to build a safe system for the example such that:
(F1) the error configurations where neither driver nor VC is available are not reachable; (F2) the velocity of the train keeps always in the safe range, although in the presence of denial-of-service attack from the driver or the VC.
Furthermore, when the behavior of the environments (i.e. driver and VC) is determined, e.g. by defining some constraints among the constants of the whole system, we can learn more precise behavior of the train. In Section 2 and Section 3, we present the syntax and semantics for the formal modeling language. It is a combination of Hybrid CSP (HCSP) [5, 19] , a process algebra based modeling language for describing hybrid systems, and the binders from Quality Calculus [13] , a process calculus that allows one to take measures in case of unreliable communications. With the introducing of binders, the modelling language is capable of programming a safe system that executes in an open environment that does not always live up to expectations.
In Section 4, we define an inference system for reasoning about HCSP with binders. For each construct P , the specification is of the form {ϕ} P {ψ, HF }, where ϕ and ψ are the pre-/post-condition recording the initial and terminating states of P respectively, and HF the history formula recording the whole execution history of P (thus able to specify global invariants). As a direct application, the (un-)reachability analysis can be performed by identifying the points corresponding to the error configurations by logical formulas and then checking the (un-)satisfiability of the formulas. In Section 5, we have applied a theorem prover we have implemented to verify properties (F1) and (F2) of the train control example. At last, we conclude the paper and address some future work.
Related Work
There have been numerous work on formal modeling and verification of hybrid systems, e.g., [1, 11, 6, 10, 7] , the most popular of which is hybrid automata [1, 11, 6] . For automata-based approaches, the verification of hybrid systems is reduced to computing reachable sets, which is conducted either by model-checking [1] or by the decision procedure of Tarski algebra [7] . However, hybrid automata, analogous to state machines, has little support for structured description; and meanwhile, the verification of it based on reachability computation is not scalable and only applicable to some specific linear hybrid systems, as it heavily depends on the decidability of the problems to be solved. Applying abstraction or (numeric) approximation [4, 2, 3] can improve the scalability, but as a pay we have to sacrifice the precision.
In contrast, deductive methods increasingly attract more attention in the verification of hybrid systems as it can scale up to complex systems. A differential-algebraic dynamic logic for hybrid programs [14] was proposed by extending dynamic logic with continuous statements, and has been applied for safety checking of European Train Control System [15] . However, the hybrid programs there can be considered as a textual encoding of hybrid automata, with no support for communication and concurrency. In [8, 16] , the Hoare logic is extended to hybrid systems modeled by Hybrid CSP [5, 19] , and then used for safety checking of Chinese Train Control System. But the logic lacks compositionality.
All the work mentioned above focus on safety without considering denial-of-service security attacks from the environment. Quality Calculus [13, 12] for the first time proposed a programming notation for expressing denial-of-service in communication systems, but is currently limited to discrete time world.
Syntax
We first choose Hybrid CSP (HCSP) [5, 19] as the modelling language for hybrid systems. HCSP inherits from CSP the explicit communication model and concurrency, thus is expressive enough for describing distributed components and the interactions between them. Moreover, it extends CSP with differential equations for representing continuous evolution, and provides several forms of interrupts to continuous evolution for realizing communication-based discrete control. On the other hand, Quality Calculus [13, 12] is recently proposed to programming software components and their interactions in the presence of unreliable communications. With the help of binders specifying the success or failure of communications and then the communications to be performed before continuing, it becomes natural in Quality Calculus to plan for reasonable behavior in case the ideal behavior fails due to unreliable communication and thereby to increase the quality of the system.
In our approach, we will extend HCSP further with the notion of binders from Quality Calculus, for modelling hybrid systems in the presence of denial-of-service because of unreliable communications. The overall modelling language is given by the following syntax:
Expressions e are used to construct data elements and consist of constants c, data variables x, and function application f k (e 1 , ..., e k ). Binders b specify the inputs and outputs to be performed before continuing. The output ch!e{u 1 } expects to send message e along channel ch, with u 1 being the acknowledgement in case the communication succeeds, and the dual input ch?x{u 2 } expects to receive a message from ch and assigns it to variable x, with u 2 being the acknowledgement similarly. We call both u 1 and u 2 acknowledgment variables, and assume in syntax that for each input or output statement, there exists a unique acknowledgement variable attached to it. In the sequel, we will use V and A to represent the set of data variables and acknowledgement variables respectively, and they are disjoint. For the general form & q (b 1 , · · · , b n ), the quality predicate q specifies the sufficient communications among b 1 , · · · , b n for the following process to proceed. In syntax, q is a logical combination of quality predicates corresponding to b 1 , · · · , b n recursively (denoted by q 1 , · · · , q n respectively below). For example, the quality predicates for ch!e{u 1 } and ch?x{u 2 } are boolean formulas u 1 = 1 and u 2 = 1. There are two special forms of quality predicates, abbreviated as ∃ and ∀, with the definitions:
More forms of quality predicates can be found in [13] . Example 1. For the train example, define binder b 0 as & ∃ (dr?x a {u a }, vc?y a {w a }), the quality predicate of which amounts to u a = 1 ∨ w a = 1. It expresses that, the train is waiting for the acceleration from the driver and the VC, via dr and vc respectively, and as soon as one of the communications succeeds (i.e., when the quality predicate becomes true), the following process will be continued without waiting for the other. ⊓ ⊔ P, Q define processes. The skip and assignment x := e are defined as usual, taking no time to complete. Binders b are explained above. The continuous evolution F (ṡ, s) = 0&B , where s represents a vector of continuous variables andṡ the corresponding first-order derivative of s, forces s to evolve according to the differential equations F as long as B, a boolean formula of s that defines the domain of s, holds, and terminates when B turns false. The communication interrupt F (ṡ, s) = 0&B ☎ b → Q behaves as F (ṡ, s) = 0&B first, and if b occurs before the continuous terminates, the continuous will be preempted and Q will be executed instead.
The rest of the constructs define compound processes. The parallel composition P Q behaves as if P and Q run independently except that the communications along the common channels connecting P and Q are to be synchronized. In syntax, P and Q in parallel are restricted not to share variables, nor input or output channels. The sequential composition P ; Q behaves as P first, and if it terminates, as Q afterwards. The conditional ω → P behaves as P if ω is true, otherwise terminates immediately. The condition ω can be used for checking the status of data variables or acknowledgement, thus in syntax, it is a boolean formula on data and acknowledgement variables (while for the above continuous evolution, B is a boolean formula on only data variables). The repetition P * executes P for arbitrarily finite number of times. It should be noticed that, with the addition of binders, it is able to derive a number of other known constructs of process calculi, e.g., internal and external choice [13] .
Example 2. Following Example 1, the following model
denoted by P 0 , expresses that, the train moves with velocity v and acceleration a, and as soon as b 0 occurs within T time units, i.e. the train succeeds to receive a new acceleration from either the driver or the VC, then its acceleration a will be updated by case analysis. It can be seen that the acceleration from VC will be used in priority. For later reference we have annotated the program with labels (e.g. 1, 2, etc.). ⊓ ⊔
Transition Semantics
We first introduce a variable now to record the global time during process execution, and then define the set V + = V ∪A∪{now}. A state, ranging over σ, σ ′ , assigns a value to each variable in V + , and we will use Σ to represent the set of states. A flow, ranging over h, h ′ , defined on a closed time interval [r 1 , r 2 ] with 0 ≤ r 1 ≤ r 2 , or an infinite interval [r, ∞) with some r ≥ 0, assigns a state in Σ to each point in the interval. Given a state σ, an expression e is evaluated to a value under σ, denoted by σ(e) below.
Each transition relation has the form (P, σ)
, where P is a process, σ, σ ′ are states, h is a flow, and α is an event. It represents that starting from initial state σ, P evolves into P ′ and ends with state σ ′ and flow h, while performing event α. When the above transition takes no time, it produces a point flow, i.e. σ(now) = σ ′ (now) and h = {σ(now) → σ ′ }, and we will call the transition discrete and write (P, σ)
instead without losing any information. The label α represents events, which can be a discrete internal event, like skip, assignment, evaluation of boolean conditions, or termination of a continuous evolution etc., uniformly denoted by τ , or an external communication, like output ch!c{1} or input ch?c{1}, or an internal communication ch †c{1}, or a time delay d for some positive d. We call the events but the time delay discrete events, and will use β to range over them.
(ch?x{u}, σ) The transition relations for binders are defined in Table 1 . The input ch?x{u} may perform an external communication ch?c{1}, and as a result x will be bound to c and u set to 1, or it may keep waiting for d time. For the second case, a flow h d over [σ(now), σ(now) + d] is produced, satisfying that for any t in the domain, h d (t) = σ[now → t], i.e. no variable but the clock now in V + is changed during the waiting period. Similarly, there are two rules for output ch!e{u}.
Before defining the semantics of general binders, we introduce two auxiliary functions. Assume (b 1 , · · · , b n ) is an intermediate tuple of binders that occurs during execution (thus some of b i s might contain ǫ), q a quality predicate, and σ a state. The function 
, indicating that the train succeeds to receive c a from the driver after d time units have passed, but fails for the VC;
, for the opposite case of the first;
, indicating that the train succeeds to receive messages from the driver as well as the VC after d time. ⊓ ⊔
The transition relations for other processes are defined in Table 2 . The rules for skip and assignment can be defined as usual. The idle rule represents that the process can stay at the terminating state ǫ for arbitrary d time units, with nothing changed but only the clock progress. For continuous evolution, for any d > 0, it evolves for d time units according to F if B evaluates to true within this period (the right end exclusive).
, where S(t) is the solution as defined in the rule. Otherwise, the continuous evolution terminates at a point if B evaluates to false at the point, or if B evaluates to false at a positive open interval right to the point.
For communication interrupt, the process may evolve for d time units if both the continuous evolution and the binder can progress for d time units, and then reach the same state and flow as the continuous evolution does. It may perform a discrete event over b, and if the resulting binder b ′ is not ǫ, then the continuous evolution is kept, otherwise, the continuous evolution will be interrupted and Q will be followed to execute, and for both cases, will reach the same state and flow as the binder does. Finally, it may perform a τ event and terminate immediately if the continuous evolution terminates with a τ event but b not. Notice that the final state σ ′′ needs to be reconstructed from σ ′ by resetting the acknowledgement variables of those unsuccessful binders occurring in b to be 0. Before defining the semantics of parallel composition, we need to introduce some notations. Two states σ 1 and σ 2 are disjoint, iff dom(σ 1 ) ∩ dom(σ 2 ) = {now} and σ 1 (now) = σ 2 (now). For two disjoint states σ 1 and σ 2 , σ 1 ⊎ σ 2 is defined as a state over dom(
. We lift this definition to flows h 1 and h 2 satisfying dom(h 1 ) = dom(h 2 ), and define h 1 ⊎ h 2 to be a flow such that h 1 ⊎ h 2 (t) = h 1 (t) ⊎ h 2 (t). For P Q, assume σ 1 and σ 2 represent the initial states for P and Q respectively and are disjoint. The process will perform a communication along a common channel of P and Q, if P and Q get ready to synchronize with each other along the channel. Otherwise, it will perform a discrete event, that can be τ , an internal communication of P , or an external communication along some non-common channel of P and Q, if P can progress separately on this event (and the symmetric rule for Q is left out here). When neither internal communication nor τ event is enabled for P ||Q, it may evolve for d time units if both P and Q can evolve for d time units. Finally, the process will perform a τ event and terminate as soon as both the components terminate.
At last, the rules for conditional, sequential, and repetition are defined as usual.
Example 4.
Starting from state σ 0 , the execution of P 0 in Example 2 leads to the following cases (let v 0 denote σ 0 (v) below):
Skip, Assignment and Idle (skip, σ)
then we define h 1 . . . h n as the flow from P to P n with respect to the initial state σ, and furthermore, write (P, σ)
. . h n ) to represent the whole transition sequence (and for simplicity, the label sequence can be omitted sometimes). When P n is ǫ, we call h 1 . . . h n a complete flow of P with respect to σ.
Inference System
In this section, we define an inference system for reasoning about both discrete and continuous properties of HCSP with binders, which are considered for an isolated time point and a time interval respectively.
History Formulas
In order to describe the interval-related properties, we introduce history formulas, that are defined by duration calculus (DC) [18, 17] . DC is a first-order interval-based real-time logic with one binary modality known as chop . History formulas HF are defined by the following subset of DC:
where ℓ is a temporal variable denoting the length of the considered interval, • ∈ {< , =} is a relation, T a non-negative real, and S a first-order state formula over process variables. For simplicity, we will write ⌈S⌉ < as an abbreviation for ⌈S⌉ ∨ ℓ = 0. HF can be interpreted over flows and intervals. We define the judgement h,
As defined above, ℓ indicates the length of the considered interval; ⌈S⌉ asserts that S holds almost everywhere in the considered interval; and HF ⌢ interval can be divided into two sub-intervals such that HF 1 holds for the first and HF 2 for the second. The first-order connectives ¬ and ∨ can be explained as usual.
All axioms and inference rules for DC presented in [17] can be applied here, such as
The specification for process P takes form {ϕ} P {ψ, HF }, where the pre-/post-condition ϕ and ψ, defined by FOL, specify properties of variables that hold at the beginning and termination of the execution of P respectively, and the history formula HF , specifies properties of variables that hold throughout the execution interval of P . The specification of P is defined with no dependence on the behavior of its environment. The specification is valid, denoted by |= {ϕ} P {ψ, HF }, iff for any state σ,
Acknowledgement of Binders
In order to define the inference rules for binders b, we first define an auxiliary typing judgement ⊢ b ◮ ϕ, where the first-order formula ϕ describes the acknowledgement corresponding to successful passing of b, and is defined without dependence on the precondition of b. We say b ◮ ϕ valid, denoted by |= b ◮ ϕ, iff given any state σ, if (b, σ) − → (ǫ, σ ′ , h), then σ ′ |= ϕ holds. The typing judgement for binders is defined as follows:
As indicated above, for input ch?x{u}, the successful passing of it gives rise to formula u = 1, and similarly for output ch!e{u}; for binder & q (b 1 , · · · , b n ), it gives rise to formula [{q}](ϕ 1 , · · · , ϕ n ), which encodes the effect of quality predicate q to the subformulas ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n corresponding to b 1 , . . . , b n respectively. 
Inference Rules
We first introduce an auxiliary function mv(b), which given a binder b, returns the variables that may be modified by b. It can be defined directly by structural induction on b and we omit the details. The inference rules for deducing the specifications of all constructs are presented in Table 3 .
Statements skip and assignment are defined as in classical Hoare Logic, plus ℓ = 0 in the history formula, indicating that they both take zero time to complete. For each form of the binders b, the postcondition is the conjunction of the quantified precondition ϕ over variables in mv(b) and the acknowledgement corresponding to the successful passing of b. The binders may occur without waiting any time, indicated by ℓ = 0 as one disjunctive clause of each history formula. For both ch?x{u} and ch!e{u}, if the waiting time is greater than 0, then ϕ will hold almost everywhere in the waiting interval {ϕ} skip {ϕ, ℓ = 0} {ψ[e/x]} x := e {ψ, ℓ = 0} Table 3 . An inference system for processes (the only possible exception is the right endpoint, at which the communication occurs and variables might be changed correspondingly). For & q (b 1 , · · · , b n ), only the quantified ϕ over variables in mv(b) is guaranteed to hold almost everywhere throughout the waiting interval, since some binders b i s that make q true might occur at sometime during the interval and as a consequence variables in ϕ might get changed. For continuous evolution, the notion of differential invariants is used instead of explicit solutions. A differential invariant of F (ṡ, s) = 0&B for given initial values of s is a first-order formula of s, which is satisfied by the initial values and also by all the values reachable by the trajectory of s defined by F within the domain B. A method on generating differential invariants for polynomial differential equations was proposed in [9] . Here we assume Inv is a differential invariant with respect to precondition ϕ for the continuous evolution (more details on using Inv are shown in the later example proof). For the postcondition, the quantified ϕ over the only modified variables s, the closure of ¬B, and the closure of Inv hold. The closure cl(·) extends the domain defined by the corresponding formula to include the boundary. For the history formula, the execution interval may be 0, or otherwise, the quantified ϕ over s, B and Inv holds almost everywhere throughout the interval.
For communication interrupt, if b fails to occur before the continuous evolution terminates, the effect of the whole statement is almost equivalent to the continuous evolution, except that some variables in b may get changed because of occurrences of some communications during the execution of the continuous evolution. Otherwise, if b succeeds within the termination of the continuous evolution, the continuous evolution will be interrupted and Q will start to execute from the interrupting point. At the interrupting point, the acknowledgement of b holds, and moreover, because s and variables in mv(b) may have been modified, ∃mv(b).((∃s.ϕ) ∧ cl(Inv)) holds (the closure here is to include the case when the interrupting point is exactly the termination point of the continuous evolution). For the second case, the postcondition is defined as the one for Q, and the history formula as the chop of the one for the continuous evolution before interruption and the one for Q afterwards. Finally, as indicated by the rule, the postcondition and history formula for the whole statement are defined as the disjunction of the above two cases.
The rule for P Q is defined by conjunction, however, because P and Q may terminate at different time, the formula True is added to the end of the history formula with short time interval to make the two intervals equal. For P ; Q, the history formula is defined by the concatenation of the ones of P and Q. The rule for ω → P includes two cases depending on whether ω holds or not. At last, for P * , we need to find the invariants, i.e. ϕ and Inv, for both the postcondition and history formula.
The general inference rules that are applicable to all constructs, like monotonicity, case analysis etc., can be defined as usual and are omitted here.
We have proved the following soundness theorem:
Theorem 1. Given a process P , if {ϕ} P {ψ, HF } can be deduced from the inference rules, then |= {ϕ} P {ψ, HF }.
PROOF. We need to prove that, for any state σ,
The proof is given by structural induction on P as follows.
-The proof for skip and x := e is trivial. 
The fact is proved based on the inductive hypothesis on Q. -Cases P Q, P ; Q and ω → P : According to the transition system, for P Q, suppose P and Q terminate at the same time, then there must exist σ 1 , h 1 , and
The fact is proved by induction hypothesis on P and Q. The other cases can be proved easily. Similarly, the rules for P ; Q and ω → P can be proved by induction hypothesis, and we omit the details here.
-Case P * : According to the transition system, we have
, and a sequence of transitions as follows:
For the first case, the fact holds trivially. For the second case, suppose the fact holds when k < n for some n > 0, next we prove that the fact holds for k = n. According to the transition rule, we have
By induction hypothesis on P , σ n |= ϕ and h n ,
Application: Reachability Analysis
The inference system can be applied directly for reachability analysis. Given a labelled process S (a process annotated with integers denoting locations), a precondition ϕ and a location l in S, by applying the inference system, we can deduce a property ψ such that if S reaches l, ψ must hold at l, denoted by ⊢ S, l, ϕ ◮ ψ. In another word, If ⊢ S, l, ϕ ◮ ψ and ψ is not satisfiable, then l will not be reachable in S with respect to ϕ. We have the following facts based on the structural induction of S:
-for any process P , ⊢ l P, l, ϕ ◮ ϕ and ⊢ P l , l, ϕ ◮ ψ provided {ϕ} P {ψ, −};
Obviously, the monotonicity holds: if ⊢ S, l, ϕ ◮ ψ and ψ ⇒ ψ ′ , then ⊢ S, l, ϕ ◮ ψ ′ .
Example 6. Consider P 0 in Example 2. Given precondition ϕ , we have
, the formula is un-satisfiable, thus location 5 is not reachable. Other locations can be considered similarly. ⊓ ⊔ Implementation We have mechanized the whole framework in Isabelle/HOL and implemented an interactive theorem prover for reasoning about hybrid systems modeled using HCSP with binders 3 .
Train Control Example
We apply our approach to the train control system depicted in Fig. 1 : firstly, we construct the formal model for the whole system, especially the train; secondly, prove for the train that it is safe against denial-of-service security attack with respect to properties (F1) and (F2); finally, explore the constraints that relate the constants of different components and learn more precise behavior of the train. Assume for the train that its acceleration ranges over [−c, c] for some c > 0, and the maximum speed is v max .
Models
The model of the train is given in Table 4 . There are two auxiliary processes: given a clock variable t and time T , MV (t, T) defines that the train moves with velocity v and acceleration a for up to T time units; and SC defines the feedback control of the train when the services from the driver or the VC fail: it performs an emergency brake by setting a to be −c , and as soon as v is reduced to 0, resets a to be 0, thus the train keeps still finally. The main process TR models the movement of a train. The train first moves for at most T 1 time units, during which it is always ready to send v to the driver as well as the VC along trd and trv respectively. If neither of them responses within T 1 , indicated by t 1 ≥ T 1 , the self control is performed. Otherwise, if at least one communication occurs, the movement is interrupted and a sequence of case analysis is followed to execute.
The first case, indicated by u v = 1 and w v = 1, represents that the driver as well as the VC succeed to receive v. The train will wait for at most T 2 time units for the new acceleration from the driver or the VC along dr and vc respectively, and during the waiting time, it continues to move with the original acceleration. The new acceleration is expected to satisfy a safety condition V A(v, a):
which implies the boundaries for setting a to be positive or negative and is necessary for keeping the velocity always in [0, v max ], otherwise, it will be rejected by the train. If both the driver and the VC fail to response within T 2 , indicated by t 2 ≥ T 2 , the self control is performed. Otherwise, the following case analysis is taken: If the train receives a value (i.e. y a ) from VC, indicated by w a = 1, then sets y a to be the acceleration if it satisfies V A, otherwise, performs self control; if the train receives a value (i.e. x a ) from the driver but not from the VC, updates the acceleration similarly as above; if the train receives no value from both (in fact never reachable), the skip is performed.
The other three cases, indicated by u v = 1 ∧ w v = 0, u v = 0 ∧ w v = 1, and u v = 0 ∧ w v = 0, can be considered similarly.
One possible implementation for driver and VC is given in Table 5 , in which process wait T i for i = 3, 4 is an abbreviation for t i := 0; ṫ i = 1&t i < T i . In process DR, the driver asks the velocity of the train every T 3 time units, and as soon as it receives Table 5 . The models of driver and VC will give up. The auxiliary process clock is introduced to prevent deadlock caused by the situation when the driver succeeds to receive velocity v d from the train but fails to send acceleration d a to the train within a reasonable time (i.e. T 5 here). VC and DR have very similar structure, except that VC has a different period T 4 , and it will choose −c or c as the acceleration for the first two critical cases mentioned above.
Finally, the train control system can be modeled as the parallel composition: SYS = TR * DR * VC * CK * . By using * , each component will be executed repeatedly.
Proofs of Train
First of all, we define the precondition of TR * , denoted by ϕ 0 , to be V A(v, a) ∧ 0 ≤ v ≤ v max ∧ −c ≤ a ≤ c, which indicates that in the initial state, v and a satisfy the safety condition and are both well-defined.
Secondly, we need to calculate the differential invariants for differential equations occurring in TR. Consider the equation in MV(t 1 , T 1 ), the precondition of it with respect to ϕ 0 , denoted by ϕ 1 , can be simply calculated, which is ϕ 0 ∧ t 1 = 0, then by applying the method proposed in [9] : 
, which is not satisfiable, thus location 1 is never reachable. Similarly, we can deduce that locations 2, 3, 4 are not reachable as well. Furthermore, by applying the inference system, we can deduce the specification {ϕ 0 } TR {ϕ 0 , ⌈0 ≤ v ≤ v max ⌉ < }. After one loop of execution of the train, ϕ 0 still holds at termination. Thus, all the above reachability results obtained for TR still hold for TR * , whose execution is equivalent to some finite number of executions of TR. Finally, plus that ⌈0 ≤ v ≤ v max ⌉ < is idempotent over chop, we can deduce {ϕ 0 } TR * {ϕ 0 , ⌈0 ≤ v ≤ v max ⌉ < }, denoted by (TrainSpec), which implies that 0 ≤ v ≤ v max is an invariant for the train.
By applying our interactive theorem prover, the fact (TrainSpec) is proved as a theorem, and the above reachability results can be implied from the lemmas proved for corresponding processes, according to the method introduced in Section 4.2.
We can see that, most of the proofs need to be performed in an interactive way, mainly because of the following reasons: firstly, we need to provide the differential invariants by ourselves during proof of continuous evolution; and secondly, we need to conduct the proof of DC formulas by telling which axiom or inference rule of DC should be applied. For the first problem, we will consider the integration of the prover to a differential invariant generator that can be implemented based on the method proposed in [9] . For the second, we will consider the decidability of DC and design algorithms for solving the decidable subsets, or as an alternative approach, consider translating DC formulas into HOL formulas in a semantic way and applying the existing automatic solvers for HOL instead. Both of these will be our future work.
Constraints of Constants
We can further analyze the behavior of the whole system SYS. By defining the constraints relating different constants, the behavior of communications between the three components can be determined. Consider the first loop of execution of each component, based on reachability analysis, we have the following facts: for locations 0, 5, 6, t 1 = 0, t 3 = T 3 and t 4 = T 4 hold respectively, and for locations 7, 8, 9, t 1 ≤ T 1 , t 3 ≥ T 3 and t 4 ≥ T 4 hold respectively. The synchronization points have four possibilities: (7, 8) , (7, 9) , (7, 8, 9) , or none. For the first case, i.e. the train succeeds to communicate with the driver but not with the VC, there must be t 1 = t 3 < t 4 , and if T 3 < T 4 and T 3 ≤ T 1 hold, this case will occur. The second one is exactly the contrary case. For the third case, there must be t 1 = t 3 = t 4 , and if T 3 = T 4 ≤ T 1 holds, this case will occur. Finally, if both T 3 > T 1 and T 4 > T 1 hold, the last case occurs, i.e., locations 7, 8 and 9 are not reachable, and thus the train fails to communicate with both the driver and the VC. Following this approach, more precise behavior of the communications of the train can be obtained.
Conclusion and Future Work
This paper proposes a formal modeling language, that is a combination of hybrid CSP and binders from quality calculus, for expressing denial-of-service due to unreliable communications in hybrid systems. With the linguistic support, it is able to build a safe hybrid system that behaves in a reasonable manner in the presence of denial-of-service security attack. The idea is that, when the service from the controllers fails, the physical system itself needs to provide feedback control, in order to meet the safety requirements. The paper also develops an inference system for reasoning about such systems, with no dependence on the behavior of the environment, and furthermore implements an interactive theorem prover. We illustrate our approach by considering an example taken from train control system.
The investigation of our approach to more complex hybrid systems is one of our future work. Meanwhile, for facilitating practical applications, we will consider to achieve more support of automated reasoning in the theorem prover.
